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Ostensibly this book is a Foucauldian genealogy of state funded education and examination. As such, 
it is much more a book of philosophical narrative than a history. It attempts to disrupt received 
perceptions of our contemporary social conditions, reconceiving our selves and our society in such a 
way as to provoke its readers to think about changing them. Readers of Nietzsche - whose own 
Genealogy of Morals greatly influenced Foucault - will quickly recognise his stylistic as well as 
philosophical influence on Benign Violence. Allen writes in quasi-aphoristic, loosely connected 
paragraphs, which lend themselves to ‘dipping in’ as much as a reading from cover to cover. The 
preface is quick to warn off those expecting an academic text and entirely dismissive of reviewers 
who would place it in an academic context and judge it by those standards: ‘If judges appear, it 
would be better if the reviews were bad’ (p. xi). Unfortunately in this case I cannot give the author 
the pleasure of a bad review. 
Allen’s  first chapter, or ‘collection’ as he refers to it, ‘Bodies’, is the shortest and puts 
forward an argument for how the subject is, and has for a long time, been constructed by 
examination. In it he rejects superficial contemporary criticisms of various processes of examination 
as well as the suggestion that a good teacher does not examine. For Allen these positions miss the 
inherent logic of examination which is not only an abstract influence on individual lives and 
educational practice but also a material process which is the defining ontological condition of 
educational institutions. He argues that to reject this unsettling of the human subject’s control over 
itself is also to reject the inconstancy of what it means to be human. To avoid examination and its 
influence is to fall back on unexamined ‘truths’ which are, in fact, abstractions external to the 
subject. Even though it might be unsettling to accept that the construction of our selves is so 
determined by examination, to not do so is, for Allen, to have very little understanding of our selves 
at all.  
The second collection, ‘Populations’ engages primarily with the unacknowledged influence 
that Allen feels the logic of eugenics and its means of examination has had on education. He makes 
his argument alongside an exposition of the importance of genealogy, which for him gives us ‘an 
impression of the way in which power conditions us’ (p. 70).  Here Allen draws a distinction between 
two Foulcauldian terms, disciplinary power and biopower. The former is an influence on the 
construction of its subjects for their utility while the latter accounts for already existing 
characteristics of its subjects and attempts to maintain their lives. Allen shows through Foucault that 
both forms of power can operate at the same time and that both were complicit in the operation of 
eugenic examination in Nazi Germany, as well as in the examination inherent to modern welfare 
programs. For Allen these forms of power are not good or evil but rather tools with which to 
understand the operation of the social. 
These first two collections set the scene for the last, ‘Meritocracies’, which is by far the 
longest and also the most clearly related to the condition of examination in contemporary society. 
Meritocracy is described here as a means by which the illusion of individual success can be 
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presented to all, while inequality continues to grow. In this collection Allen provides searing critiques 
of formative assessment, the benevolent violence of educators, and attempts at various forms of 
meritocratic schooling and examination systems. While traditional meritocracy afforded those of 
different examinable abilities a job which was deemed equivalent, ‘fluid meritocracy’ is fuelled by 
contemporary aspirational rhetoric which offers the possibility of success to the individually 
responsible subject, whose success is not based only on ability but on ability and effort. The duty is 
then removed from the state in locating and facilitating those with ability, from whatever social 
background.  This change of perception means that lack of success can be put down to lack of effort. 
For Allen this contemporary predicament in education and society can be seen as both futile and 
absurd but because it is now so ingrained in our social relations, the entire system must be rejected 
to rid ourselves of it.  
This is a brave and important book which sets forth an intensely claustrophobic analysis of 
the operation of power in society, creating new precedents for future critiques of education, 
examination and meritocracy. It provides terms and means with which to better understand 
contemporary issues and debates, without ever stooping to offer naïve, cheap and easy solutions. It 
is a provocative and compelling text which demands to be read and responded to. For example, 
while this is an outstanding example of Foucauldian genealogy, other philosophical approaches 
might put some of Allen’s more general conclusions into question or offer a less resigned outlook. 
One typical post-Foucauldian criticism might be that, in presenting conditions which supposedly 
affect everyone, Allen obscures the existence of relatively unaffected outliers (whether individuals 
or institutions), for whom other conditions might be significantly more affecting.  However, even if 
the genealogical approach of Benign Violence might run the risk of only providing one part of the 
story, it is a part that should not be ignored. 
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